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ABSTRACT 
Over the past two decades, Tanzania has embarked on a marked liberalization of its 
trade regime.  The Government wants this reform process to continue and sees 
international integration at the global and regional level as a means to achieve higher 
economic efficiency, productivity and international competitiveness.  This study reviews 
the trade policy situation in Tanzania and identifies a number of key issues and 
challenges for the country.  In particular, the analysis describes the state of domestic 
trade policy, examines regional integration efforts, and identifies priorities for the 
attention of policy makers and international donors. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Over the past two decades, Tanzania has embarked on a marked liberalization of its trade 
regime.  The Government wants this reform process to continue and sees international integration 
at the global and regional level as a means to achieve higher economic efficiency, productivity 
and international competitiveness.  This study reviews the trade policy situation in Tanzania and 
identifies a number of key issues and challenges for the country.  In particular, the analysis 
describes the state of domestic trade policy, examines regional integration efforts, and identifies 
priorities for the attention of policy makers and international donors. 
Upon joining the East African Community (EAC) customs union in January 2005, 
Tanzania changed its import regime and adopted the EAC common external tariff.  As a results, 
its listed average import duty rate fell moderately from 13.8 per cent to 12.3 per cent.  The tariff 
regime continues to be escalatory and generates significant domestic market protection and anti-
export bias.  The scale and dispersion of policy-induced transfers distorts production incentives 
and makes it possible for a considerable number of value-subtracting firms to persist.  The 
authorities should rebalance their trade incentives in order to increase the efficiency of the 
economy. 
Export restrictions have been phased out for most products in the late 1990s.  However, 
in 2003 the Government introduced a 15 per cent export tax on raw hides and skins to assist the 
struggling domestic tanning and leather industry by discouraging exports and making a larger 
number of domestically produced hides and skins available for local processing.  Yet, given the 
importance of informal trade in hides and skins and world-wide experience with export 
restrictions, the success of this strategy is highly uncertain.  The Government should critically 
assess the effectiveness of the restrictions with a view to phasing them out. 
Tanzania has reduced its dependence on trade taxes as sources of government revenue 
through the introduction of value-added taxation.  Import duties now account for less than 10 per 
cent of government income compared with more than a third in the mid-1990s.  This development 
represents a major achievement that should be consolidated by further strengthening the domestic 
tax system, and thereby laying the foundation for deeper international integration of the economy. 
Tanzania is committed to the process of regional integration and is pursuing closer ties 
with neighboring African nations.  The country is engaged in two regional trade agreements 
(RTAs), namely the East African Community and the Southern African Development 
Community, and is considering to re-enter the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 
from which it withdrew in 2000.  However, as regional trade is of only modest importance and 
external tariffs remain high, there is a considerable risk that regional agreements have a net trade-
diverting and welfare-diminishing impact.  In order to reduce this risk, Tanzania should push for 
reductions in the EAC‟s common external tariff and anchor its regional integration efforts firmly 
within a framework of multilateral liberalization, while leveraging cooperation at the regional 
level to tackle regulatory impediments to trade. 
The simultaneous participation in several regional trade agreements and their potentially 
conflicting liberalization requirements and schedules poses a number of challenges for trade 
policy makers in Tanzania.  Pertinent questions relate to the consistency of tariff schedules in 
different RTAs and potential conflicts in the application of different trade standards and border 
procedures.  These questions will gain in prominence, as the overlapping RTAs deepen their 
integration.  At some point, Tanzania might be faced with the dilemma of having to choose one 
RTA over the others in order to avoid contradictory requirements.   
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1. BACKGROUND 
Over the past two decades, Tanzania has made significant progress in opening up its 
economy to international markets, but still does not fully exploit its potential to benefit from 
trade.  In the mid-1980s, increasing supply shortages and a worsening balance of payments in the 
largely state-controlled economy contributed to triggering a fundamental change in economic and 
trade policy orientation.  The previously pursued “policy of confinement” was abandoned and 
liberalization efforts were initiated.  Restrictions on imports were gradually reduced, foreign 
exchange transactions were freed up, and the structure of tariffs was simplified.  These reforms 
were reinforced and extended in the early 1990s when import bans for luxury goods and licensing 
requirements for exports were abolished and the private sector was granted permission to 
compete in the processing and marketing of cash crops.  Moreover, since the late 1990s 
quantitative restrictions and taxes on most exports have been eliminated (World Bank, 2002) and 
progress has been made in liberalizing the financial, telecommunications, and transportation 
sectors (Musonda, Kweka and Kabelwa, 2004).  Import tariffs were adjusted and gradually 
reduced on several occasions over time, most recently when Tanzania joined the East African 
Community (EAC) customs union in January 2005.   
The marked liberalization of the trade regime is reflected in indicators of market 
openness, such as  tariff rate averages.  Tanzania‟s tariffs have fallen by more than 7 percentage 
points since the late 1990s. While other countries in Eastern and Southern Africa have liberalized 
in parallel, Tanzania‟s import duties have declined clearly below the regional average (Figure 1). 
In February 2003, the Government explicitly laid out its future international integration 
strategy by publishing a comprehensive set of principles and objectives for trade policy making 
(United Republic of Tanzania, 2003).  This National Trade Policy assigns a central role to trade 
as a means to achieve higher efficiency, productivity and international competitiveness.  
Moreover, export-led growth is identified as being instrumental for economic development and 
poverty eradication.  To reap these benefits, further international integration efforts are envisaged. 
In particular, the National Trade Policy lays down five specific objectives.  These 
concern: 
i. improvements in physical infrastructure and information dissemination; 
ii. establishment of an integrated, diversified and competitive economy; 
iii. stimulation of value-adding activities on primary export commodities; 
iv. attraction of investment flows into sectors that have a comparative advantage; and 
v. attainment of a balanced current account. 
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Figure 1:  Simple tariff averages in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(in per cent) 
Note:  The membership in the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) overlaps. 
Source: International Monetary Fund. 
 
The following discussion reviews the trade policy situation in Tanzania in the context of 
these objectives and identifies a number of key issues and challenges for the country.  The focus 
of the study is thereby on how trade taxes and quantitative restrictions affect the goods sector.  
The analysis falls into three parts.  First, the state of domestic trade policy is described, with 
particular emphasis on the structure and economic effects of border policies.  Then, Tanzania‟s 
regional integration efforts are examined, including a preliminary assessment of the impacts of 
the formation of the EAC customs union with Kenya and Uganda.  And finally, some priorities 
for the attention of policy makers and international donors are identified based on the preceding 
analysis. 
 
2. DOMESTIC TRADE POLICIES 
Tanzania‟s main trading partners are located in Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
East Asia (Table 1).  In 2003, these three regions accounted for almost 90 per cent of the 
country‟s exports and two-thirds of all imports.  Trade relationships have intensified in particular 
with Sub-Saharan countries since the late 1990s, even though official statistics should be 
interpreted with care, as unrecorded transactions are important in the region. 
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Table 1:  Structure of Tanzania’s Merchandise Trade 
(per cent of gross domestic product) 
 Total Trade Exports Imports Net-Exports 
 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 
All Goods             
World 22.2 21.5 33.1 7.5 7.2 11.8 14.7 14.3 21.3 -7.2 -7.1 -9.5 
East Asia & Pacific 4.7 5.2 6.5 1.5 0.7 1.3 3.2 4.5 5.2 -1.7 -3.8 -3.9 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
Middle East & North Africa 1.7 0.9 4.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.5 0.8 3.8 -1.3 -0.7 -3.4 
North America 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 
South Asia 2.4 2.2 2.6 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.8 0.1 0.2 -1.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 3.7 7.2 1.1 0.9 2.7 2.9 2.8 4.5 -1.8 -1.9 -1.8 
Western Europe 7.3 7.6 10.9 2.8 3.9 6.4 4.5 3.7 4.5 -1.7 0.3 1.9 
Agriculture, and Food, Beverages and Tobacco          
World 9.5 7.3 8.1 6.6 4.7 5.2 2.9 2.6 2.9 3.6 2.1 2.3 
East Asia & Pacific 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.4 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.3 0.4 -0.7 -0.7 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 
Middle East & North Africa 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 
North America 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
South Asia 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.1 1.0 0.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.4 1.0 1.9 0.8 0.4 1.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 -0.1 1.1 
Western Europe 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.2 1.9 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.0 1.9 1.5 
Mining and Basic Metals             
World 1.0 2.2 6.1 0.0 1.3 5.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 -1.0 0.4 3.9 
East Asia & Pacific 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Middle East & North Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
North America 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
South Asia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
Western Europe 0.2 1.4 4.1 0.0 1.2 4.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.2 1.0 3.9 
Industrial Manufacturing             
World 11.6 12.1 18.9 0.9 1.3 1.6 10.7 10.8 17.3 -9.8 -9.6 -15.7 
East Asia & Pacific 2.1 3.1 3.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.0 3.0 3.6 -1.9 -2.9 -3.5 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 
Middle East & North Africa 1.2 0.7 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.7 3.6 -1.2 -0.7 -3.6 
North America 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.9 0.8 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 
South Asia 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.9 1.2 -0.9 -0.8 -1.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.2 2.4 4.5 0.3 0.4 0.9 1.9 2.0 3.6 -1.6 -1.7 -2.7 
Western Europe 4.2 3.8 4.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 3.8 3.2 3.9 -3.5 -2.6 -3.4 
Note:  Industrial Manufacturing refers to all manufacturing sectors except Food, Beverages and Tobacco, 
and Basic Metals (ISIC revision 2 codes 31 and 37).  Trade with non-specified countries is included in the 
World-total. 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on UN COMTRADE database accessed through WITS. 
 
The value of imported goods has regularly exceeded the value of goods-exports in 
Tanzania.  In 2003, the merchandise trade deficit amounted to 9.5 per cent of gross domestic 
product (GDP).  Imports exceeded exports for all major geographical regions in the world, except 
 7 
Western Europe.  On a sectoral basis, Tanzania has had a trade surplus for agricultural and 
mining products and related manufactures, but a large deficit for industrial manufactures. 
2.1 Import Policies 
Tanzania is a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its trade 
policy is guided by adherence to WTO rights and obligations.  Tanzania grants at least most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment to its trading partners.  All tariffs are ad valorem, and there are 
no seasonal duties, tariff quotas, or variable levies.  Tanzania has tariff bindings at a rate of 
120 per cent on goods in 755 tariff lines, covering all agricultural goods and some manufactured 
products.  Bound tariffs represent the maximum allowable tariffs that WTO members have 
scheduled as part of their commitments in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  
Application of import duties above bound rates is not allowed, unless trading partners adversely 
affected by the tariff change are compensated. 
Yet, countries are free to apply import duties that are lower than their bindings, which is 
the case in Tanzania.  The country‟s simple MFN-tariff average across all tariff lines was 13.5 per 
cent in 2004 and the import-weighted average amounted to 8.8 per cent (Table 2).  The applied 
tariff structure is escalatory with four duty bands being employed in 2004, ranging from zero to 
25 per cent.  Capital goods and unprocessed materials could enter the country free of import duty, 
while tariffs of 10, 15, and 25 per cent, respectively, were charged on semi-processed inputs, fully 
processed inputs, and final consumer goods.  Of the 5324 tariff lines, 3550 (or 67 per cent) were 
non-zero, with 2084 (39 per cent) being subject to the highest duty rate of 25 per cent.  While 
duty exemptions for imports by central and local governments were abolished in July 2002, 
exemptions continued to be granted for projects financed by development partners, charitable 
organizations and entities with statutory exemptions or under bilateral agreements.  Estimates put 
the value of duty exemptions in Tanzania at about 9 per cent of potential customs revenue 
(Castro, Kraus and de la Rocha, 2004). 
In addition to the MFN-tariffs, Tanzania used to apply suspended duties to imports of 
goods in 128 tariff lines until the end of 2004.  Most of these surcharges were ad valorem levies, 
while a few tariff lines were subject to specific duties.  The additional import taxes were 
supposed to protect domestic industry from unfair competition until new legislation on anti-
dumping and countervailing duties, which was enacted in April 2004, would be fully 
implemented.  The highest suspended duty rate amounted to 40 per cent, bringing the peak 
applied tariff rate to 65 per cent (25 per cent MFN-tariff plus 40 per cent suspended duty).  
Moreover, minimum dutiable values of USD 390 per metric ton applied to imports of sugar. 
Imports from members of the East African Community (EAC) and the South African 
Development Community (SADC) enter the Tanzanian market under preferential conditions.  In 
particular, the tariffs applied to imports from EAC partner countries in 2004 amounted to a fifth 
of the MFN rates, while the tariff preferences applied to imports from SADC vary by country-
group and type of product.  Yet, Tanzania applied suspended duties on EAC imports in 635 tariff 
lines, eroding the offered preferential market access to some extent (Table 2). 
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Table 2:  Key Indicators of Tanzania’s Import Regime 
 Number of tariff lines Number of 
bands 
Minimum 
rate 
Maximum 
rate 
Standard 
deviation 
Simple 
average 
Weighted 
average  Total Non-zero 
Situation 2004 :         
Base tariff-MFN 5324 3550 4 0 25 10.7 13.5 8.8 
- agricultural products 779 672 4 0 25 9.0 20.3 16.0 
- industrial products 4545 2878 4 0 25 10.5 12.3 7.9 
         
Listed tariff-MFN 5324 3550 10 0 65 11.4 13.8 9.3 
- agricultural products 779 672 6 0 35 9.2 20.8 18.6 
- industrial products 4545 2878 10 0 65 11.3 12.7 8.0 
         
Base tariff-EAC  5324 3550 4 0 5 2.1 2.7 1.8 
- agricultural products 779 672 4 0 5 1.8 4.1 3.1 
- industrial products 4545 2878 4 0 5 2.1 2.5 1.6 
         
Listed tariff-EAC  5324 3550 12 0 25 6.7 4.6 3.7 
- agricultural products 779 672 8 0 25 4.1 4.8 8.1 
- industrial products 4545 2878 12 0 25 7.1 4.6 3.2 
         
Situation 2005 :         
CET (without sensitive products) 4972 3045 3 0 25 11.0 11.8  
- agricultural products 736 669 3 0 25 8.3 20.6  
- industrial products 4236 2376 3 0 25 10.7 10.3  
         
CET (with sensitive products) 5028 3098 10 0 105 12.1 12.3  
- agricultural products 767 697 7 0 105 12.2 22.0  
- industrial products 4261 2401 8 0 65 11.2 10.5  
         
Note:  Listed tariffs are import duty plus suspended duty.  Agricultural products are those in HS 01-24, and industrial ones those in HS 25-99.  Calculations are 
done at the 8-digit HS-level.  Weighted tariffs are based on 2003 import data. 
Source:  World Bank staff based on information from Tanzania‟s National Bureau of Statistics, the Tanzania Revenue Authority, and UNCTAD‟s-TRAINS 
database accessed through WITS. 
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The application of suspended duties and minimum dutiable values reduced the 
transparency of the import regime, accentuated the dispersion in the tariff structure, and led to 
more pronounced tariff escalation.  The latter generates high effective rates of protection (ERPs) 
for producers that have access to inputs at low-tariff rates, while being able to shield behind high 
import barriers for their final products.  By taking into account protection on both outputs and 
inputs, ERPs provide a better representation of tariff-generated transfers to producers than 
nominal rates of protection (NRPs), which are based on protection of outputs only.  In some 
sectors in Tanzania, ERPs exceed NRPs substantially and reach levels of more than 100 per cent.  
Also, ERPs show a larger variation across sectors than NRPs and range from –16 per cent for 
transport equipment to 216 per cent for chemicals (Table 3). 
 
Table 3:  Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection 
(in per cent) 
Sector  Listed tariff Ex-post tariff Listed CET 
 NRP  ERP NRP  ERP NRP  ERP 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 5.9 20.8 5.9 26.3 11.2 34.0 
Food 25.5 32.7 22.7 39.7 22.2 25.8 
Beverages 25.0 48.7 24.3 45.3 25.0 44.8 
Tobacco 5.9 52.1 3.5 36.3 25.0 47.1 
Textiles and Textile Products 20.0 155.1 5.5 74.3 24.3 165.1 
Leather and Leather Products 3.3 67.0 2.8 59.5 12.7 82.3 
Wood and Furniture 15.4 11.7 10.9 5.3 19.6 21.1 
Paper and Publishing 8.7 7.1 4.8 0.7 10.3 12.0 
Chemicals and Chemical Products 24.0 215.8 21.5 215.6 24.1 217.6 
Rubber and Plastics 21.6 54.3 9.9 27.7 23.1 55.0 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 24.7 125.8 16.3 87.2 24.8 123.5 
Basic Metals and Fabricated Products 12.4 40.3 7.6 37.2 19.7 73.2 
Machinery 11.7 -3.3 9.8 -7.9 7.2 -25.6 
Transport Equipment 0.3 -22.3 0.2 -15.9 10.4 -9.0 
Note:  Listed tariffs are import duty plus suspended duty.  Ex-post tariffs are average tariffs (i.e. customs 
receipts divided by cif import values). . 
  Source: Maxwell Stamp (2003). 
 
Imports are subject to the same value-added and excise tax rates as domestically 
produced goods.  Indeed, a large share of the excise duty revenues, which are charged at specific 
or ad valorem rates of up to 30 per cent, is derived from goods that are mainly imported, such as 
petroleum and cars.  Also, the collection of value-added taxes is to a significant extent based on 
imports.  In this context, the authorities should pay attention that not only the indirect tax rates 
but also the intensity and yield of tax collection is similar for imported and domestic products.  
Otherwise, the indirect taxes could turn into implicit barriers to trade by raising the costs of 
imports relative to domestically produced goods. 
While the Government views import taxes in part as a means of protecting domestic 
industry from foreign competition, it is unclear whether the distribution and scale of protection 
granted to different industries has been intentional.  Domestic market protection comes at a cost, 
notably to consumers and firms that source their inputs domestically.  Also, tariff protection 
introduces an anti-export bias.  If firms produce for the export market, they do not receive the 
same market price support that producers for the domestic market enjoy.  Tanzania operates 
manufacturing-under-bond and duty drawback systems, which make it possible for exporters to 
be exempted from or to claim back the duty paid on inputs of exported products.  These 
arrangements thus neutralize the effects of tariff policy for exporting firms, even though there are 
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complaints from companies that the duty refunds are delayed by several months or even years.  In 
any case, since Tanzania can not influence world market prices, exporters do not receive the 
significant policy-generated transfers that producers for the domestic market obtain, thus biasing 
producers‟ decisions against selling abroad.  Indeed, the higher the domestic market protection is, 
the stronger the anti-export bias becomes. 
Yet, awareness among officials of the potentially adverse effects of protectionisms seems 
not always sufficient, which could lead to tolerance of costly resource misallocations.  In a recent 
survey of 152 manufacturing enterprises, 24 firms were found to be value-subtracters (Maxwell 
Stamp, 2003).  The value of their tradable production inputs at international prices exceeded the 
trade value of their final products.  Because of the distorted domestic price structure, these 
companies were not necessarily loss-making and could, hence, continue to operate, although they 
were clearly representing a waste of resources for the economy overall.  Results from a follow-up 
enterprise survey confirm the existence of value-subtractors in Tanzania and suggest that these 
highly inefficient firms are particularly prevalent in the milling, furniture, metals, and textiles 
sub-sectors (Table 4).  
One characteristic of Tanzania‟s import policy that increases the risk of allowing value-
subtracters to persevere is that high market price support is granted to manufacturing branches 
with low value-added.  Sectors like chemicals or textiles for which the share of value-added in 
sales revenue is relatively small receive strong market protection, while high value-added 
industries, like paper and publishing, machinery, and transport equipment, are not supported to a 
significant extent or even taxed through high tariffs on imported inputs (Figure 2).  This structure 
of protection supports the survival of firms that are internationally uncompetitive and that 
generate little income to pay wages and income taxes, while imposing significant costs on the 
economy through high output prices.  In this context, a rebalancing of trade incentives appears 
desirable with a view to initiating an efficiency-enhancing restructuring process in low value-
added manufacturing branches and thus reducing the risk of policy-induced resource 
misallocations. 
 
Figure 2:  Effective Rates of Protection and Value-added in Manufacturing, 2002 
 
 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on Maxwell Stamp (2003) and National Bureau of Statistics (2003). 
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Table 4:  Effective Rates of Protection for Selected Sub-Sectors  
(in per cent) 
Sub-sector Listed tariff Ex-post tariff Listed Common 
External Tariff  MFN EAC MFN EAC 
Cotton -22.0 -6.3 -22.0 -6.3 10.8 
Dairy 187.2 37.2 192.4 51.0 11.8 
Fish 30.0 3.7 30.8 5.9 31.3 
Milling -VAw -VAp -VAw -VAp -VAw 
Milling * 31.0 6.0 25.6 6.2 -3.7 
Oils -27.1 4.2 -33.0 -1.8 25.4 
Tea/coffee 55.6 5.6 47.4 5.1 28.6 
Tea/coffee 53.4 5.5 45.5 5.0 27.8 
Alcoholic drink 48.4 38.6 46.6 37.6 33.2 
Soft drinks 122.2 -4.3 147.9 -19.2 134.3 
Soft drinks * 35.5 -4.2 37.3 -19.1 38.0 
Paints & inks 49.9 5.6 34.2 5.6 26.4 
Soaps & detergents 34.4 46.9 35.3 34.4 47.7 
Other chemicals 10.7 2.2 10.6 2.1 25.1 
Other chemicals * 10.7 2.2 10.6 2.1 25.1 
Mattresses 28.4 5.6 16.6 3.0 28.4 
Mattresses * 27.6 5.4 16.1 2.9 27.6 
Other furniture -VAw -VAp -VAw -VAp -VAw 
Other furniture * 35.9 5.7 15.0 4.4 40.0 
Articles of metal 10.9 4.0 0.8 2.8 11.1 
Articles of metal * 10.9 4.0 0.8 2.8 11.1 
Basic metals -VAw -VAp -VAw -VAp -VAw 
Basic metals * 16.7 3.3 7.8 3.2 10.8 
Paper products 18.3 24.0 8.3 9.0 15.6 
Printing & publishing -1.2 3.0 -4.3 2.5 -8.5 
Printing & publishing * -1.2 2.9 -4.2 2.5 -8.3 
Stationery 30.3 62.5 8.2 51.4 2.1 
Stationery * 9.9 7.5 6.5 6.2 13.5 
Textile articles -VAw -VAp -VAw -VAp -VAw 
Textile articles * 10.3 2.2 10.4 0.5 18.1 
Yarns & fabrics 47.9 13.7 21.3 -5.4 14.1 
Yarns & fabrics * 46.1 13.2 20.5 -5.2 13.6 
Articles of wood 48.8 8.2 46.4 7.7 43.8 
Articles of wood * 36.6 6.8 24.8 6.3 27.2 
Basic timber 18.5 3.6 5.0 2.9 7.5 
Basic timber * 16.4 3.2 4.6 2.5 6.9 
Joinery 37.5 7.7 -5.1 7.6 43.3 
Notes :  1) "*" means that enterprises with negative value added (at world or EAC prices) have been excluded.  
2) "-VAw" means that sector value added is negative at world prices.  3) "-VAp" means that sector value added 
is negative at EAC prices.  4) "Tariff Protection" includes the excises and VAT payable upon import duties, but 
not on the values of the goods.  5)  Listed tariffs are import duty plus suspended duty.   6)  Ex-post tariffs are 
average tariffs (i.e. customs receipts divided by cif import values).  
Source:  Rajhi and Webster (2004). 
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The sectors producing textiles and leather, and machinery and equipment display the 
strongest export orientation in terms of the share of domestic output that is sold abroad (Table 5).  
Given the high effective rates of protection for textiles and the resulting anti-export bias, the 
prominence of textiles exports might seem surprising, but a large share of these exports is sold in 
industrialized country markets under preferential access conditions.  Moreover, exports are very 
volatile over time, so that the export to output ratios and export growth rates for particular 
manufacturing branches can change significantly from one year to the next.  The indicators 
should, hence, be treated with care.  Concerning import substitution, the sectors for non-metallic 
minerals, and food, beverages and tobacco have the largest domestic market shares, although 
import growth of non-metallic mineral has been strong since the late 1990s.   
 
Table 5:  Indicators of Trade Performance in the Manufacturing Sector 
(in per cent) 
 Ratio of imports  
to apparent 
consumption, 2002 
Ratio of exports to 
domestic output, 
2002 
Average annual 
growth of imports, 
1997-03 
Average annual 
growth of exports, 
1997-03 
Food, Beverages 
and Tobacco 
32 13 0.8 3.0 
Textiles and 
Leather  
52 21 9.0 11.3 
Wood and 
Furniture 
40 9 12.9 -1.7 
Paper and 
Publishing 
40 1 6.4 11.3 
Chemicals, Rubber 
& Plastic  
72 11 27.2 40.1 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals 
24 10 14.2 5.9 
Machinery and 
Equipment 
98 19 7.9 16.9 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on National Bureau of Statistics (2003) and UN COMTRADE database 
accessed through WITS. 
 
Tanzania changed its structure of domestic market protection when joining the customs 
union with Kenya and Uganda in January 2005.  Tariff rates were adjusted to the level of the 
common external tariff, suspended duties and minimum dutiable values were discontinued or 
replaced by special tariffs on “sensitive products”, while intra-regional trade barriers will be 
phased out.  In particular, the arrangement calls for Kenya to eliminate all tariffs on imports from 
Uganda and Tanzania, and for Uganda and Tanzania to eliminate tariffs on each other‟s imports.  
Regarding imports from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania will eliminate tariffs on all imports except 
for an agreed on list of products for which the tariff will be gradually reduced to zero over a 
period of up to five years.  Tanzania‟s list contains 859 products, which are deemed sensitive due 
to their importance for tariff revenues or industrial development.  The asymmetry in liberalizing 
intra-regional trade is intended to give Tanzania and Uganda, which are less developed and have 
a large trade deficit with Kenya, additional time to initiate structural adjustments (Bheenick, 
2003).  Small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, are very concerned about competition 
from more established Kenyan producers and fear to be squeezed out of the common market by 
cheaper imports (Confederation of Tanzania Industries, 2004). 
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The agreed common external tariff has an escalatory three-band structure, with a zero rate 
for raw materials, capital goods, and meritorious goods, such as medical, pharmaceutical and 
educational supplies; a 10 per cent rate for intermediate goods, and a 25 per cent maximum rate 
for finished goods.  The customs union protocol provides for a revision of the top rate five years 
after the customs union entered into force, and it is expected that the top rate will at that point be 
reduced to 20 per cent.  Almost 40 per cent of all tariff lines are subject to the maximum rate 
(Table 6). 
 
Table 6:  The EAC Common External Tariff 
Category  Number of tariff lines Ad valorem tariff (per cent) 
Items in zero band  1927 0 
- of which:  Meritorious goods 105 0 
 Raw materials  1111 0 
 Capital Goods 711 0 
Intermediate goods  1159 10 
Finished goods  1886 25 
Source:  World Bank Staff. 
 
In the negotiations on the formation of the customs union, the three EAC partners agreed 
on a list of 56 sensitive products to which “special tariffs” apply.  For about a third of the 
sensitive products, the special tariff rates are the same across the three countries, while for the 
other two-thirds different duty levels apply, representing a departure from the principle of a 
common external tariff.  In Tanzania, special tariffs range from zero to 105 per cent, with the top 
rate applying to imports of sugar, which was up to the end of 2004 subject to minimum dutiable 
values. 
As a result of the adoption of the common external tariff, the listed average duty rate fell 
from 13.8 per cent to 12.3 per cent.  This reduction is due to lower industrial tariffs, while duties 
on agricultural imports actually increased on average.  The tariff changes are modest in 
magnitude for most products and sectors, but estimates of ERPs under the customs union regime 
indicate that the dispersion of protection levels increased (Table 3), further augmenting the risk of 
resource misallocation. 
 
2.2 Export Policies 
Possible misdirection of resources could also become an issue with some measures that 
are applied to exports.  By 1998, trade liberalization had resulted in the removal of requirements 
for export registration, licensing, and surrender of proceeds, as well as the elimination of most 
commodity export taxes.  However, some non-governmental crop boards, such as the Cotton 
Development Fund and the Cashew Nuts Development Fund, continue to levy fees on their 
members‟ exports to finance research, extension services, and training (Baffes, 2004; Mitchell, 
2004).  Exporters of cotton and raw cashew nuts are required to pay a 3 per cent export charge, 
while processed cashews are subject to a 1 per cent levy. 
Similarly, the Fisheries Department collects royalties on fish exports.  Rates are set at 
what is estimated to be 6 per cent of fob-value, but charged per kilogram rather than on an ad 
valorem basis in an attempt to reduce evasion through underinvoicing (Wilson, 2004).  The duty 
revenues are used by the Fisheries Department to foster development in the sector. 
 14 
Moreover, in 2003 the government introduced an export tax of 15 per cent on raw hides 
and skins, and established a Livestock Development Fund to administer the revenues from the 
duty.  The principal aim of the measure is to assist the struggling domestic tanning and leather 
industry by discouraging exports of raw hides and skins and making a larger number of 
domestically produced hides and skins available for local processing.  However, the success of 
this strategy is uncertain.  A study on Tanzania‟s leather and footwear sectors found that one of 
the main reasons for the insufficient capacity utilization of domestic processing facilities was the 
poor quality of locally produced hides and skins (Kiruthu, 1999).  More than half of total supply 
was considered to be unsuitable for processing.  This deficiency is related to inadequate animal 
husbandry practices, prevalent livestock diseases, inappropriate slaughtering facilities, poor 
slaughtering practices, and deficient preservation techniques.  Depressing the domestic price level 
through the imposition of export taxes will further reduce the value that farmers and 
slaughterhouse operators attribute to hides and skins and, hence, their incentives to produce high-
quality raw materials for the tanning and leather industries. 
Also, it is unclear to what extent the export taxes will succeed in discouraging exports of 
raw hides and skins rather than just enticing producers to trade informally.  Tanzania has long 
land-borders that traders and their livestock can relatively easily cross.  Indeed, the value of 
informal trade between Tanzania and its neighbors is significant (World Food Programme, 2004) 
and according to some estimates even exceeds the value of formal transactions (Ackello-Ogutu 
and Echessah, 1998).  One indication that a large part of the trade in raw hides and skins might 
indeed have turned informal is that revenues from the export tax during July to December 2003 
have amounted to less than 40 per cent of the government‟s target (Mramba, 2004). 
Informal trade had also been undermining quantitative restrictions on trade in tea.  Until 
March 2004, Tanzania operated a “special trading arrangement” for tea that involved an export 
ban on green leaf tea and import bans on black and packed tea in order to support the domestic 
blending and packing industry.  Yet despite the bans, “illegal” trade with neighboring countries 
was estimated to reach a magnitude corresponding to about a third of the domestically consumed 
tea (Baffes, 2003). 
Local taxes constitute another, although unintentional, policy impediment to exports 
(Booth and Kweka, 2004).  Despite a directive form the Prime Minister‟s Office that district taxes 
should not exceed 5 per cent of the goods value, local authorities continue to levy charges at 
points of transit as well as original sale.  For producers that are distant from export locations, the 
cumulative burden of the local taxes can be considerable and will, in combination with the high 
transport costs due to the poor state of freight infrastructure, tend to discourage export operations. 
In general, export restrictions introduce costly distortions into the domestic economy and 
do most often fail to achieve their industrial development objectives.  Similar to import 
restrictions, export bans and taxes encourage inefficient production and consumption patterns and 
an suboptimal resource allocation (Piermartini, 2004).  Moreover, there are frequently adverse 
distributional impacts.  If the export restrictions concern primary commodities, as in Tanzania, it 
is often poor smallholders that have to bear the bulk of the economic costs as prices for their 
produce are depressed. 
 
2.3 Revenues from Trade Taxes 
The government‟s dependence on trade taxes as sources of revenue has declined 
significantly over time  Before the introduction of value-added taxation in 1997, import duties 
used to account for more than a third of government revenues (41 per cent in 1995/96 and 34 per 
cent in 1996/97).  In the financial year 2003/04, taxes on imported goods still accounted for 
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almost 40 per cent of the total tax revenue collected by the government (Figure 3), but the bulk of 
these import-related revenues came from non-discriminatory value-added and excise taxes, while 
the share of tariff revenues in total receipts amounted to less than 10 per cent.    The ratio of duty 
revenues to total governmental receipts has thereby become one of the lowest among Eastern and 
Southern African countries (Khandelwal, 2004) 
 
Figure 3:  Share of Trade Taxes in Government Revenue, 2003/2004 
Source:  Ministry of Finance. 
 
Comparing government revenues from import duties with the value of imports makes it 
possible to determine the ex-post average tariff rate, which takes into account the reduced duties 
on imports under preferential agreements, duty exemptions, and “leakage” due to weak customs 
control.  If the average of the import duty revenues for 2002/03 and 2003/04 is related to the 
value of imports in 2003, the ex-post average tariff rate comes to 5.5 per cent.  The corresponding 
average total ex-post burden of trade taxes on imports, including value-added and excise taxes, 
amounted to 23.3 per cent. 
The formation of the customs union with Kenya and Uganda with the adoption of the 
common external tariff, the phase-out of intra-EAC tariffs and the abolishment of suspended 
duties will have an impact of fiscal revenues.  The government expects that the overall effect will 
be positive and that additional revenues of TZS 1 138 million (USD 1.1 million, or 0.8 per cent of 
import duty revenues in 2003/04) will be generated during the fiscal year 2004/05 (Mramba, 
2004).  Other studies project modest revenue losses of 4.2 per cent of import duty revenues in 
Tanzania, with most of the revenue shortfalls being associated with imports of machinery and 
transport equipment, as well as food and live animals (Castro, Kraus and de la Rocha, 2004). 
Import duties
9.4%
VAT on imports
21.7%
Excises on imports
8.4%
Income tax
25.1%
VAT, domestic
15.9%
Excises, domestic
6.4%
Other  revenue
13.1%
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The implications for tariff revenues and the potential need to establish a compensation 
fund to stabilize government income in partner countries have been discussed extensively in the 
run-up to the formation of the customs union.  Related concerns were particularly prominent in 
the public debate in Tanzania and Uganda.  However, analysis of the likely impact of the 
implementation of the customs union showed that the short-term revenue losses were relatively 
evenly spread across partner countries, eliminating the need for a compensatory mechanism 
(Busse and Shams, 2003). 
In case revenue losses occur, the fiscal shortfalls would best be addressed by improving 
customs administration, border controls, and transit arrangements in order to reduce “unofficial 
exemptions” and smuggling.  If these measures are not sufficient, revenues from non-
discriminatory excise taxes levied at equal rates on imports and domestic products and 
improvements in the yield of existing value-added taxes should be used to replace the forgone 
tariff revenues.  A restructuring of the indirect tax system is, in any case, desirable, as deeper 
integration into the world trading system will tend to further reduce tariff revenues over time. 
 
3. REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Tanzania is committed to the process of regional integration and is pursuing closer ties 
with neighboring African nations.  The country is engaged in two regional trade agreements 
(RTAs), namely the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and is considering to re-enter the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), from which it withdrew in 2000.  Moreover, Tanzania participates 
in the Regional Integration Facilitation Forum, and has a considerable number of bilateral trade 
agreements, even though the latter are not always thoroughly implemented (Kweka and Leyaro, 
2004). 
While the regional integration efforts are intended to harmonize economic policy and 
promote trade, their underlying motivation seems to have been mostly political rather than 
economic.  SADC, in particular, has for a long time had a development approach to regional 
integration, stemming from the economic independence desires and political security needs of the 
Front Line States (Kritzinger-van Niekerk and Moreira, 2002).  Similarly, the EAC has an agenda 
that spans far beyond trade and economic integration.  Yet, given the low per capita incomes in 
Tanzania and the country‟s development needs, the economic impacts of the regional initiatives 
deserve the greatest attention of policy makers and international donors. 
 
3.1 History of Regional Integration 
East Africa has a long history of regional integration.  Kenya and Uganda first formed a 
customs union in 1917, which the then Tanganyika joined in 1927.  Subsequently, the three 
countries had close economic relationships in the East African High Commission (1948-1961), 
the East African Common Services Organisation (1961-1967), the East African Community 
(1967-1977), and the East African Co-operation (1993-1999).  In November 1999, the Treaty for 
the establishment of the (new) East African Community was signed, and entered into force in July 
2000. 
In the EAC-Treaty, the partner countries had stated their intention to form a customs 
union by 2004, but the integration process was delayed and the EAC Trade Protocol was not 
signed before March 2004.  After subsequent ratification in national Parliaments, the customs 
union was finally launched in January 2005, establishing a common external tariffs and removing 
all intra-regional trade barriers during a five-year transition period.  Once the customs union is 
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completed, the EAC partners envisage further integration steps with the creation of a common 
market, a monetary union, and ultimately a political federation, although no time table has been 
established yet. 
Tanzania is also an active member in SADC, which in 1992 grew out of the Southern 
African Development Co-ordination Conference.  SADC‟s Trade Protocol, which was signed in 
1996 and came into effect in October 2000, aims to remove intra-regional trade barriers and turn 
the Community into a free trade area for 85 per cent of goods by 2008, and for all goods by 2012.  
Tariff reductions are asymmetrical, with domestic market protection vis-à-vis South Africa (and 
indirectly the entire Southern African Customs Union area) staying in place for longer than vis-à-
vis other SADC countries (Figure 4).  Plans for the formation of a customs union and a common 
market have been under discussion. 
 
Figure 4:  Tanzania’s Tariff Liberalization Commitments in SADC 
(weighted average tariffs, in per cent) 
 
 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on Mushiri (2002). 
 
Moreover, Tanzania used to be a member of COMESA, which had been founded in 1994.  
One of the main objectives of this regional initiative was to establish a free trade area, which was 
(partly) achieved in October 2000, when nine of COMESA‟s members removed their intra-
regional trade barriers.  A further integration step in the form of the establishment of a customs 
union, which had been planned for 2004, has been postponed, as the final structure of the 
common external tariff has yet to be agreed upon. 
Tanzania is no longer a member of COMESA after leaving the Agreement in 2000.  The 
withdrawal decision was based on an assessment that multiple RTA-membership was too 
resource-consuming and that Tanzania's regional integration interests were better served by its 
membership in SADC.  Moreover, concerns about revenue losses as a result of ongoing 
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COMESA tariff liberalization are also believed to have contributed to the decision (WTO, 2000).  
Yet, Tanzania continues to be influenced by trade policy developments in COMESA, not least 
because Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania‟s two partners in the EAC customs union, are both 
members of COMESA. 
 
3.2 Importance of Regional Trade 
Tanzania‟s trade relationships with other countries in the region have intensified in recent 
years, both in terms of the volume of trade and the scope of traded goods (Kweka and Mboya, 
2004).  However, according to official statistics, regional trade remains only of modest overall 
importance for the country.  The eight countries with which Tanzania has land-borders have a 
combined population and gross domestic product that is five and four times, respectively, the size 
of Tanzania‟s.  Yet, in 2003 these neighbors absorbed less than 14 per cent of Tanzanian exports 
and were the origin of less than eight per cent of the country‟s imports.  The value of trade with 
all African countries accounts for less than a quarter of Tanzania‟s total exports and imports 
(Table 7).  It should be noted, though, that these figures do not reflect underreported or informal 
trade. 
Tanzania‟s most important regional export markets in 2003 were Kenya, Uganda, and 
South Africa, and the regional trading partners with the largest import share in the Tanzanian 
market were South Africa, Kenya, and Swaziland.  More than 90 per cent of Tanzania‟s regional 
trade was undertaken with members of EAC or SADC, that is under terms of preferential market 
access.  Tanzania lost preferential access to Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, Rwanda, and Sudan when it left COMESA in 2000.   
The Tanzanian authorities tried to negotiate bilateral agreements with the countries that 
are members of COMESA but not SADC in order to maintain the tariff preferences that had been 
achieved through earlier liberalization steps within COMESA.  This attempt did succeed only 
with Tanzania‟s EAC partners, Kenya and Uganda, with whom the achieved preference margins 
were frozen.  Preferential trade relations with the other COMESA-but-not-SADC members were 
discontinued.  While trade with the “COMESA only” group of countries accounts for less than 
two per cent of Tanzania‟s total exports and imports (Table 7), Tanzania has consistently had a 
merchandise trade surplus with the group since 1997.  Also, a relatively large share of the trade 
with “COMESA only” is in industrial goods, which motivates interest of industrial producers in 
Tanzania in re-entering COMESA and obtaining better access to “COMESA only” markets 
(Matambalya, 2004). 
EAC and SADC accounted in 2003 both for about ten per cent of Tanzania‟s total 
exports, with EAC trade being focused on agri-food products, while exports to SADC members 
consisted mainly of mining and industrial products.  On the import side, SADC was almost three 
times as important as EAC as a source of goods.  As a result, Tanzania had a sizable trade deficit 
with SADC, while for the first time in many years it boosted a surplus vis-à-vis its EAC partners. 
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Table 7:  Structure of Tanzania’s Merchandise Trade within the Region 
(per cent of gross domestic product) 
  Total trade Exports Imports Net-Exports 
  1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 
All Goods              
World  22.2 21.5 33.1 7.5 7.2 11.8 14.7 14.3 21.3 -7.2 -7.1 -9.5 
- Africa  4.0 3.7 7.3 1.1 0.9 2.7 2.9 2.8 4.6 -1.8 -1.9 -1.8 
- Members of  EAC 1.7 1.1 2.5 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.2 -0.9 -0.3 0.1 
 SADC only 1.5 1.8 3.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.4 1.7 3.0 -1.3 -1.6 -2.6 
 SADC & COMESA 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.6 
 COMESA only 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
- Other Africa  0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.0 
- Rest of World  18.2 17.8 25.8 6.4 6.3 9.1 11.8 11.5 16.7 -3.6 -3.2 -5.8 
Agriculture, and Food, Beverages and Tobacco          
World  9.5 7.3 8.1 6.6 4.7 5.2 2.9 2.6 2.9 3.6 2.1 2.3 
- Africa  1.4 1.1 1.9 0.8 0.5 1.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 -0.1 1.1 
- Members of  EAC 0.5 0.4 1.1 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 
 SADC only 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
 SADC & COMESA 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.1 0.3 
 COMESA only 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
- Other Africa  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
- Rest of World 8.1 6.2 6.2 5.8 4.2 3.7 2.3 2 2.5 2.1 3.2 2.2 
Minerals, and Base Metals             
World  1.0 2.2 6.1 0.0 1.3 5.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 -1.0 0.4 3.9 
- Africa  0.4 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
- Members of  EAC 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 
 SADC only 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
 SADC & COMESA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 COMESA only 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
- Other Africa  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
- Rest of World 0.6 1.9 5.3 0 1.2 4.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.2 -0.3 0.7 
Industrial Manufacturing *             
World  11.6 12.1 18.9 0.9 1.3 1.6 10.7 10.8 17.3 -9.8 -9.6 -15.7 
- Africa  2.3 2.4 4.6 0.3 0.4 0.9 2.0 2.0 3.7 -1.7 -1.7 -2.9 
- Members of  EAC 0.9 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.5 1.0 -0.7 -0.4 -0.7 
 SADC only 0.9 1.3 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 1.3 2.4 -0.9 -1.3 -2.3 
 SADC & COMESA 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
 COMESA only 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
- Other Africa  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
- Rest of World  9.3 9.7 14.3 0.6 0.9 0.7 8.7 8.8 13.6 -6.5 -6.2 -10.0 
Note: EAC trading partners are Kenya and Uganda; “SADC only” refers to Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and 
South Africa; “SADC & COMESA” is the group comprising Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; and “COMESA only” consists of Burundi, 
Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Rwanda, and Sudan. 
*) Industrial Manufacturing refers to all manufacturing sectors except Food, Beverages and Tobacco, and Basic 
Metals (ISIC rev. 2 codes 31 and 37). 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on UN COMTRADE database accessed through WITS. 
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However, Tanzania‟s trade positions vis-à-vis its two EAC partners differ fundamentally.  
With regard to trade with Uganda, Tanzanian exports during 2003 exceeded the value of imports 
in all goods sectors, except for wood and chemical products (Table 8).  The bilateral trade surplus 
amounted to almost 40 million USD.  With Kenya, on the other hand, Tanzania had a trade deficit 
of almost similar size, as the value of its strong agricultural, fish and textiles exports was more 
than offset through Kenyan exports of industrial products into the Tanzanian market.  In earlier 
years, Tanzania had a larger trade deficit with Kenya, while trade with Uganda was roughly in 
balance. 
 
Table 8:  Structure of Tanzania’s Trade with EAC Partners, 2003 
(„000 USD) 
ISIC-2 Sector  Kenya   Uganda  
Code Description Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
11 Agriculture and Hunting 18081 2719 15361 31599 1418 30181 
12 Forestry and logging 87 3 84 31 0 31 
13 Fishing 44532 8 44524 513 0 513 
21 Coal Mining 2 5 -4 0 0 0 
22 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas  0 94 -94 0 0 0 
23 Metal Ore Mining 0 1 -1 0 0 0 
29 Other Mining 331 1152 -821 0 0 0 
31 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 4554 7928 -3374 1094 278 815 
32 Textiles and Leather  6575 2014 4561 775 80 695 
33 Wood and Furniture 680 1540 -860 59 65 -6 
34 Paper and Publishing 469 4377 -3908 288 123 165 
35 Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic  3286 62795 -59509 4484 5814 -1330 
36 Non-Metallic Minerals  137 3748 -3611 1024 50 974 
37 Basic Metal Industries 801 8291 -7490 4373 31 4343 
38 Machinery and Equipment 3409 20316 -16907 3819 349 3470 
39-99 Other  421 1320 -899 47 2 44 
0-99 Total 83363 116310 -32948 48104 8210 39895 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on UN COMTRADE database accessed through WITS. 
 
3.3 Economic Effects of Regional Initiatives 
Economic integration at the regional level can make it possible to reap benefits from 
international specialization, while tailoring the provisions of the agreement to the particular needs 
and adjustment capacities of the countries involved.  In the short term, regional integration will 
entail adjustment needs, as prices on the domestic market change in response to tariff reforms.  
Econometric analysis based on firm-level data suggests that the adoption of the EAC‟s common 
external tariff by Tanzania will overall affect profit margins, productivity, wages and employment 
only slightly (Table 9).  The effects are not uniform across sectors, though, as the changes in 
input and output prices differ, with the paper and publishing and metals sectors being subject to 
more marked impacts.  However, these findings should be treated with care, as the estimates are 
not always statistically significant. 
 21 
 
Table 9:  Short-Term Impacts of the Adoption of the Common External Tariff in Tanzania 
(in per cent) 
Sector Price-Cost Margin Productivity Employment Wages 
Agro-industry 0.31 0.65 -2.78 0.90 
Chemicals and Paints 1.27 7.59 1.46 -0.72 
Construction Materials 0.74 1.59 -0.88 2.87 
Metals 0.33 -3.94 -5.69 4.33 
Paper and Publishing 0.71 -10.49 -9.01 6.40 
Textiles and Leather -0.21 -1.54 -1.91 0.47 
Note:  Calculations based on listed overall average tariffs. 
Source:  Rajhi and Webster (2004). 
 
In the medium and longer term, there might be more pronounced impacts.  If the 
reduction of intra-regional trade barriers fosters partner countries to expand output and exports of 
products for which they are internationally competitive, the price of final goods or production 
inputs on the importing country market falls to the benefit of consumers and input-purchasing 
producers.  In this case, additional welfare-enhancing trade is created. 
Moreover, regional trade initiatives can have beneficial indirect effects.  Opening 
domestic markets to partner countries, for example, can increase competition in sectors with 
previously highly concentrated industrial structures and thereby reduce the monopolistic pricing 
power of incumbents.  Such pro-competitive impacts are particularly important for countries like 
Tanzania that have only a nascent domestic competition policy, while showing significant 
concentration in some industrial sectors, such as cigarette manufacturing and beer brewing. 
Also, regional cooperation can be effective in harmonizing customs procedures and 
domestic regulations.  Adopting common rules on investment, for example, has the potential to 
encourage increased inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) by enhancing the credibility of 
FDI-policies and providing a restraint on sudden policy reversals.  However, so far the regional 
integration initiatives in Eastern and Southern Africa contain very few investment provisions 
(Te Velde and Fahnbulleh, 2003). 
Some observers justify RTAs in political economy terms by seeing them as laboratories 
for international integration, training grounds for negotiations at a broader level, and strategic 
means of trade policy making.  By teaming up with regional partners, countries may be able to 
increase the weight of their positions in international trade negotiations and possibly achieve 
more favorable negotiation outcomes.  Also, regional trade agreements make it possible for 
countries to gain some control over the trade policy of their partner countries. 
Conversely, engaging in RTAs implies passing parts of a country‟s sovereignty on to the 
regional bloc.  For example, as a result of joining the EAC customs union, Tanzania can no 
longer freely decide on its level of import duties, but depends on consensus with Kenya and 
Uganda to pursue changes to the common external tariff.  Hence, the institutional framework for 
trade policy making changes.  Moreover, by concluding a customs union, countries may 
implicitly have to abide to international commitments of their trading partners that are more 
stringent than their own.  In the case of the EAC, Kenya and Uganda have scheduled lower 
WTO-tariff bindings than Tanzania (Table 10).  While these commitments do formally not limit 
Tanzania‟s ability to raise the tariffs it applies towards its own binding level, the country would 
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not be able to do so without violating the common external tariff, if one of its EAC partners faces 
a binding WTO commitment in the respective tariff lines. 
 
Table 10:  WTO Tariff Bindings of EAC Members 
Country Number of bound tariff lines Minimum binding (%) Maximum binding (%) 
Kenya 748 18 100 
Tanzania 755 120 120 
Uganda 815 40 80 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on WTO Consolidated Tariff Schedules database accessed through WITS. 
 
More importantly, RTAs may result in losses of government revenues, as tariffs on intra-
regional trade are phased out (see section 2.3 above), or promote costly trade diversion rather 
than welfare-enhancing trade creation, if trade is shifted from efficient producers outside the RTA 
to preferential trading partners that produce at higher costs.  In this case, the government loses 
tariff revenue on imports from third countries, without domestic producers benefiting to a 
corresponding extent from lower import prices.  The risk for trade diversion to occur is 
particularly high if MFN tariffs remain high and trade with partner countries accounts for only a 
small share of overall trade (World Bank, 2004), as in Tanzania. 
A recent review of studies on the trade and welfare effects of customs unions concluded 
that the elimination of intra-regional trade barriers between small developing countries is likely to 
generate mostly trade diversion and little trade creation, unless significant reductions in MFN-
tariffs accompany the regional integration efforts (Schiff and Winters, 2003).  In the case of 
Tanzania, the formation of the EAC customs union and the adoption of the common external 
tariff led to modest average tariff reductions, while the top rate of 25 per cent was left unchanged.  
Analysis using a partial equilibrium model that takes into account the response of producers and 
consumers to tariff and price changes following customs union formation suggests that imports 
into Tanzania from EAC partners would grow by 3.1 per cent over 2002-levels following the 
complete phase-out of intra-regional tariffs, while imports from third countries would increase by 
14.5 per cent (Castro, Kraus, and De la Rocha, 2004).  If the top CET rate were to be reduced to 
20 per cent, the study finds that imports from third countries would grow by 16.3 per cent 
compared to the 2002-baseline, while imports from EAC partners would increase by only 2.4 per 
cent.  These results imply that a lowering of MFN-tariffs would result in a reduction (or slower 
growth compared with the baseline) of intra-regional trade.  Hence, at least some of the new EAC 
trade seems to be merely the consequence of regional tariff preferences rather than comparative 
advantage.  In other words, the EAC customs union is diverting trade away from third countries. 
Another indication that the EAC customs union might have detrimental impacts on 
Tanzania is that the country sources very few products exclusively from EAC partners.  Indeed, 
in nearly all tariff lines imports from third countries dominate imports from Kenya and Uganda 
(Castro, Kraus, and De la Rocha, 2004).  Hence, there is a risk that the extension of EAC 
preferences leads to a substitution of regional for third country imports instead of creating new 
trade.   
In general, the production and trade structures of countries in Eastern and Southern 
Africa are not particularly complementary (Chauvin and Gaulier, 2002).  Similarities between the 
export basket of one country and the import basket of another can be analyzed by using the 
bilateral product complementarity index (Tsikata, 1999).  The value of this index can range from 
zero, which represents no complementarity between exports and imports of two countries, to one 
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hundred, which implies a perfect match.  The higher the index between two countries, the greater 
the product complementarity. 
If the bilateral product complementarity index is calculated for 2003 from trade data at 
the two-digit Harmonized System classification level, Tanzania‟s export and Kenya‟s imports 
show an index value of 52.8 and Tanzania‟s imports and Kenya‟s exports a value of 42.0.  The 
corresponding values for Tanzania‟s trade with Uganda are 49.7 and 31.0.  These values for EAC 
partner complementarity fall short of those for well established, successful regional trade 
initiatives, such as the European Union (index value of 53.4) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (56.3), but exceed those of failed RTAs, such as the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (22.2) and the Andean Pact (7.4).  In any case, the EAC index values are relatively 
large by regional standards and compare well with bilateral complementarity indices between 
COMESA and SADC partners, which only in a few cases exceed 25 (Khandelwal, 2004).  Yet 
despite the low intra-regional trade intensity and complementarity in Southern Africa, ex-ante 
analysis using a computable general equilibrium model predicts that the formation of the SADC 
free trade area will be net welfare-improving, with Tanzania, however, reaping smaller benefits in 
relation to its GDP than other SADC members (Lewis, Robinson, and Thierfelder, 2003).   
While further quantitative analysis of the economic effects of regional integration 
initiatives in Eastern and Southern Africa seems warranted, the available evidence suggests that 
there is considerable uncertainty about whether the existing regional agreements are in the best 
economic interest of Tanzania and its partner countries in the region.  The authorities should try 
to maximize the benefits from Tanzania‟s RTAs by pursuing deeper integration through 
harmonization of trade standards and behind-the-border regulations.  In parallel, the Government 
should follow a paradigm of open regionalisms by continuing to push for lower external trade 
barriers in order to counter the risk of trade diversion.  RTAs should generally be seen as a means 
of economic cooperation that can contribute to the achievement of the country‟s overall 
development strategy, but that can not be a substitute for continuing domestic policy reform and 
multilateral trade liberalization. 
  
3.4 Overlapping Membership in Regional Agreements 
The simultaneous participation in several regional trade agreements poses a number of 
challenges for trade policy makers in Tanzania and in its EAC partners.  As discussed earlier, 
Tanzania is a member of SADC, but not of COMESA, while Kenya and Uganda are members of 
COMESA, but not of SADC.  This asymmetric configuration has the potential to create confusing 
and conflicting situations, which are bound to intensify over time as the respective integration 
agendas of EAC, SADC and COMESA are deepening. 
Multiple membership of overlapping RTAs creates demanding requirements in several 
respects.  In the private sector, traders have to operate within different trade regimes, each with its 
own tariff rates, regulations and procedures.  In the public sector, negotiating and serving 
different regional initiatives can absorb large amounts of scarce administrative resources and 
occupy policymakers‟ attention to a considerable extent.  In addition, budgetary contributions 
from member states towards the administration costs of the various RTAs can be a significant 
burden, as indicated by the cumulative (annual) arrears in membership contributions in SADC 
and COMESA (Kritzinger-van Niekerk and Moreira, 2002).  Also, judicial conflicts might arise 
out of the existence of alternative legal frameworks and dispute settlement mechanisms. 
One issue of particular concern are the potentially significant costs that can result from 
the need to comply with multiple rules of origin regulations (Brenton and Imagawa, 2004).  The 
EAC agreed on rules of origin that are generally in line with those used in COMESA, which 
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specify a local value addition requirement of 35 per cent or a change in tariff heading, but for a 
number of tariff lines more complex, sector and product-specific rules of origin, as in SADC, 
were adopted.  This situation with different rules of origin in EAC, SADC, and COMESA may 
pose problems for firms in EAC members that want to trade with neighboring countries and force 
them to adjust their production or trade operations.  In particular, firms might be compelled to 
focus on only certain export destinations, given that they might need to produce differently in 
order to receive preferential access in foreign markets.  Also, situations at the border may arise 
that are open to abuse or subject to excessive bureaucracy, thereby inflicting costs on traders in 
addition and beyond those related to compliance with the applicable rules of origin regulations 
(Hess, 2004). 
Another type of problem from overlapping RTA-membership relates to conflicting 
liberalization commitments and requirements in different agreements (Bohanes, 2002).  The 
SADC Trade Protocol (Article XXVIII, paragraph 2) states that member states cannot enter into a 
preferential trade agreement with third countries that may “impede or frustrate the objectives of 
this protocol and that any advantage, concession, privilege or power granted to a third country 
under such agreements is extended to other Member States.”  A similar provision is included in 
Article 56 of the COMESA Treaty.  Since upon joining the EAC customs union, Tanzania 
granted market access preferences to Kenya and Uganda that exceed those given to its SADC 
partners, the literal reading of the provision implies the requirement to extend the EAC free intra-
regional trade benefits also to all SADC countries.  However, paragraph 3 of the same Article 
grants countries an exception from the obligation to extend preferences if the additional 
concessions are undertaken in the context of an agreement that preceded the Trade Protocol.  As 
the EAC Treaty came into force three months before the SADC Trade Protocol, the waiver could 
apply.   
Indeed, after deliberating on the matter, the EAC Council decided not to extend the EAC 
market access benefits to SADC and COMESA partners.  However, the EAC members were 
allowed to continue with their existing obligations to SADC and COMESA and imports from the 
respective countries were exempted from the EAC‟s common external tariff.  This continuation of 
member-specific preferences within the customs union could result in trade deflection, unless 
border controls are maintained for strict intra-EAC policing of trade, notably verification of rules 
of origin.  Otherwise, Egyptian traders, for example, could export goods duty free to Kenya under 
the COMESA free trade arrangement and the local importers could then ship them to Tanzania 
duty-free under EAC preferences.  Conversely, SADC members could use Tanzania as a transit 
route to Kenya and Uganda.  Similar trade deflection could occur as a result of differences among 
EAC partners in tariff exemptions, providing a strong argument for their harmonization (Castro, 
Kraus, and de la Rocha, 2004).  To counter any unintended extension of preferences, border 
controls will need to continue.  Indeed, as long as the situation of overlapping membership 
remains, the EAC will not be able to become a fully functioning customs union and its members 
will not be able to reap the benefits of free internal movement of goods (Hess, 2004). 
Over the past years, SADC, COMESA and the EAC have been working more closely 
together in areas such as regional trade analysis, capacity building, and transport facilitation.  So 
far the economic integration schedules and the move towards freer intra-regional trade have not 
resulted in any major inconsistencies.  Yet, the formation of the EAC customs union and the 
possibly resulting problems of trade deflection highlight the emerging integration conflicts, as the 
individual trade initiatives deepen their status.  Both COMESA and SADC are also hoping to 
form customs unions in the medium-term future.  Since one country can not realistically apply 
two different common external tariffs, Tanzania and its EAC partners are sooner or later bound to 
face the choice about which agreement they want to go with. 
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Some analysts have argued that Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda should resign, respectively, 
from SADC and COMESA, while retaining their political affiliation through an “Associate 
Membership.”  The status of the latter would grant the right to attend meetings as observers, but 
would be free of tariff obligations and carry reduced membership fees.  The EAC would then 
negotiate preferential agreements covering all of the partner countries within SADC and 
COMESA (Hope, Bhowon and Ruhindi, 2003).  Others have suggested that the Cotonou 
Agreement and the Economic Partnership negotiations with the European Union could become 
the external driving force that would push the regional organizations to rationalize and harmonize 
their trade agreements (De la Rocha, 2003; Hinkle and Schiff, 2004).  What seems important, in 
any case, is that policy makers are aware of the possibly emerging conflicts in integration and 
liberalization schedules between different RTAs and ensure sufficient flexibility in their 
integration commitments to avoid contradictory requirements.   
 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY REFORM AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
Improvements in Tanzania‟s trade performance will depend on a number of factors.  
Important supply constraints have to be addressed (Amani, Nyange, Kweka, and Leyaro, 2003), 
including those concerning high transportation costs, inability to produce goods that meet quality 
standards in foreign markets, and high costs of doing business.  Overcoming these impediments 
will require time and a considerable amount of resources.  In contrast, improvements in core trade 
policy can be undertaken relatively quickly and without the need for large-scale financial funds.  
Indeed, an effective trade policy can contribute to mobilizing resources for growth and 
development. 
Tanzania has made considerable progress over the past two decades in liberalizing its 
economy and integrating it into the regional and global market.  The phasing-out of trade 
restrictions has played a key role in the revival of the Tanzanian export sector and the 
rationalization of imports (Kanaan, 2000), even though vested interests, such as those represented 
in the export crop boards, have in some sectors undermined the reform efforts (Cooksey, 2003).  
Moreover, the country was played an active role at the regional level and in the WTO. 
This study described and assessed Tanzania‟s trade policy situation at a critical point in 
time, i.e. just after joining the EAC customs union.  It thereby identified a number of issues that 
need to be addressed in order to make better use of Tanzania‟s trade potential.  A set of policy 
reform priorities and technical assistance needs that emerges from the preceding discussion is 
developed and presented in Table 11. 
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Table 11:  Policy Reform and Technical Assistance Matrix 
Policy issue Action recommended 
Requirements 
Agency 
involved 
Time frame 
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Import policy       
 Reduce tariff escalation by pushing for a 
reduction in the top rate within EAC. 
 X  MIT, MoF Longer term 
 Establish a time-table for the phase-out of 
special tariffs on “sensitive products”. 
 X  MIT, MoF Medium term 
 Reduce reliance on tariff revenue by reducing 
“leakage” and strengthening the tax system. 
 X  MoF, TRA Longer term 
 Improve awareness of trade policy issues 
through better communication/internet site. 
  X MIT Short term 
 Strengthen analytical skills of public officials 
for policy reform and trade negotiations. 
  X MIT Medium term 
Export policy       
 Critically assess existing export restrictions 
with a view to phasing them out. 
 X X MIT, MCM Medium term 
 Finance sector development funds from the 
budget rather than through export levies. 
 X  MoF, MNRT Longer term 
 Expedite duty drawback refunds in order to 
reduce anti-export bias. 
X   TRA Short term 
Regional integration      
 Increase professional staff in the EAC 
Secretariat to deal with enhanced tasks. 
 X  MoF Medium term 
 Harmonize exemptions within EAC to reduce 
the risk of trade deflection. 
 X  MIT, TRA Short term 
 Push for simple, non-restrictive rules of 
origin specifications in regional agreements. 
 X  MIT Longer term 
 Aim for flexibility within RTAs in order to 
avoid contradictory requirements. 
 X  MIT Longer term 
 Carefully assess the advantages and 
drawbacks of re-entering COMESA. 
  X MIT Medium term 
       
Note:  Agency abbreviations:  MIT – Ministry of Industry and Trade; MoF – Ministry of Finance; TRA – 
Tanzania Revenue Authority; MCM – Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing; MNRT – Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism. 
Time frame specifications:  Short term – within 12 months, Medium term – within 2 years, Longer term – 2 to 
5 years. 
Source:  World Bank Staff. 
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